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Abstract
The social profile and the organizational landscape of Polish diaspora, known as ‘Polonia’, in 
Australia has been undergoing a significant change: sociodemographic (ageing), sociocultural 
(diversification) and sociopolitical (integration and assimilation). The ‘wave-type’ immigration 
(1947-56 and 1980-89), combined with the sudden decline in immigration after Poland’s 
independence (1989) and accession to the EU (2004), resulted in the rapid shrinking, ageing 
and internal differentiation of the Polish community. The pre-1989 ‘ethno-representative’ 
and ex-servicemen organisations have been withering away. The ‘culture preserving’ ethnic 
organizations, as well as religious/church groups also weaken, due to their shrinking 
demographic base. The Australian ‘Polonia’ is diversifying, as well as internally dividing, the 
latter process accelerated by widening political-ideological divisions in Poland. Under the 
impact of social diversification and globalization, and in the context of evolving multicultural 
policies in Australia, new forms of organization and social activism emerge. Interethnic, 
integrative and ‘bridging’ organizations and initiatives, anchored mainly in metropolitan social 
circles of Melbourne and Sydney, attract the most educated immigrants and their offspring 
and break the mould of ethnic exclusivity. Next to traditional Polish Associations, multiplying 
Senior Clubs and still numerous Polish schools there also appear some nationalistic 
groups, active mainly in social media. These general trends: numerical decline, ageing and 
diversification (combined with political divisions) reflect the changing conditions in the 
Australian and Polish societies, as well as the processes of migrant adaptation and integration. 
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Introduction 
Polish-born immigrants-settlers in Australia form a small and shrinking segment of a broader 
‘Polonia’ or ‘Polish diaspora’ encompassing Polish immigrants and their descendants often 
referred to as ‘the Polish ethnic community’1. The Australian ‘Polonia’ has four interesting 
characteristics:  
• it has been formed mainly through the post-WWII (1945+) ‘wave-like’ migrations 
that strengthened the ethno-religious bonds and facilitated group or collective 
(rather than individual) adaptation and integration;  
• strong links with the homeland combined with intense politicisation and, more 
recently, political-partisan polarisation. Due to the ‘political’ and crisis-triggered 
origins (the takeover of Poland by the Soviet-controlled communists, persecution of 
political dissidents and Solidarity activists before 1989), and due to the cyclical 
political crises in Poland, the Australian Polonia has been intensely politicized. 
Most of Polish immigrants still see themselves as a political diaspora, and many of 
them identify themselves as ‘refugees’ and ‘political immigrants’;  
• rapid ageing – a reflection of reorientation of Polish migration after 1989, and 
especially after 2004, towards Europe, as well as declining birth rates – and, finally,  
• social diversification and widening political division, again, in line with the rapid 
diversification of the post-communist Polish society and with increasing political 
polarisation in Poland during the last decade.  
All these distinctive characteristics – as well as the accompanying changes in organisational 
forms and identities – have to be seen in the context of the processes of demographic 
transition, social adaptation and integration and cultural assimilation, the latter most 
pronounced among the children of immigrants.  
The post-WWII (1947-56) wave of Polish ex-servicemen, Displaced Persons (DPs) and 
political exiles formed initially a socially cohesive, politically united and organisationally 
fecund ethnic communities. This cohesion – still quite strong among the older migrants – has 
been weakening with the inflow of the ‘Solidarity immigrants’ in the 1980s, and with the 
ongoing social integration of the post-WWII immigrants and their children. In fact, this 
weakening-cum-diversification has been so strong, that the term ‘ethnic community’ should 
be used with caution in relation to today’s Polish minority. While the number of Polish-born 
immigrants shrinks, the young, Australian-born members of the Polish diaspora integrate and 
                                                          
1 The term ‘Polish immigrants’ refers to Australian residents born in Poland, as well as those who were born of 
Polish parents-refugees and Displaced Persons in exile. The post-WWII Polish immigrants included persons 
who identified as ‘Polish Jews’, ‘Polish Ukrainians’ or just ‘Jews’ and ‘Ukrainians’ – hence the difficulties in 
estimating precise numbers. The term ‘Australian Polonia’ or ‘Polish diaspora’ – like all socio-cultural 
(especially ethnic) categories – is also fairly imprecise. It refers to permanent residents of Australia who are, and 
who describe themselves, as persons of Polish descent and who remain attached to Polish culture and traditions 
(e.g., speak Polish) strongly enough to identify as members of Polonia (e.g., Markowski and Kwapisz Williams 
2013, p.14). The concept of ‘ethnic community’ assumes a high level of internal cohesion. As argued below, the 
Polish diaspora not only includes multiple ethnic ‘identifiers’, but also shrinks, diversifies socially and 
politically, thus becoming less and less cohesive and uniform in its identities and lifestyles. 
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adopt hyphenated identities (e.g., ‘Polish Australian’ or ‘Australian-Polish’). They are better 
educated and skilled than their ageing parents; their interest in Poland declines and changes 
into ‘ancestral’; and they seldom preserve a good command of Polish – something regarded 
in the past as the ethnic ‘core value’ and main differential of Polonia.  
There is also intense social, cultural and ideological differentiation within the Polonia. 
Independence-stressing, strongly religious (Roman Catholic) and socially conservative post-
WWII Polish refugees distance themselves from more secular, pro-democratic and liberal 
Polish immigrants from the ‘Solidarity wave’. Moreover, with the ‘Solidarity consensus’2 
rapidly evaporating in Poland and among the Polish migrants, intensely religious and anti-
communist ethno-nationalists (narodowcy) separate themselves from more secular, 
cosmopolitan and pro-multicultural liberals and social-democrats. As a result, the formerly 
socially cohesive and politically united Polonia gradually transforms into socially 
differentiated, politically diverse and loosely integrated ‘ethnic diaspora’.  
These general processes and trends are neither unusual nor unique for the Polish 
diaspora. Social and political differentiation and demographic shift are, in fact, typical of 
many ethnic minorities, especially those formed through wave-like migrations. Migratory 
waves, as widely recognized and argued below, are conducive to creating socially distinct 
and internally homogeneous socio-political segments within migrant communities. Such 
segments, in turn, sustain and enhance internal differentiation by spawning highly (and 
sharply) differentiated outlooks, identities and organisations. 
In order to describe and (at least partly) explain these general processes, we look briefly 
at the general social profiles of the two constitutive waves of Polish immigration, chart the 
processes of immigrant adaptation and integration, comment on the progressive social and 
political differentiation, and, finally, outline the main changes in the organisational profiles of 
the Australian Polonia. 
Polish immigrants in Australia 
The most recent census (2016) lists 45,370 persons as born in Poland. That is more than 13% 
decrease in 10 years. Polish language, according to the 2016 census, is used at home by about 
48,000 people that indicates the persistence of Polish exiles born abroad – a category specific 
for ethnic diasporas experiencing political turbulences – as well as a high language retention 
within the Australian Polonia (e.g., Smolicz 1988). The number of Polish speakers is only 
10% lower than 10 years ago (2006).  
Polish ancestry, often in combination with other ethnic ancestry, is declared by about 
180,000 Australians, though we can only speculate about the link between this census-
declared ancestry and ethnic identity. However, there is the obvious correlation between 
strong Polish identity, Polish birthplace and recent immigration. Predictably, indications of 
Polish ancestry as the first response fell by 2.5% in the last 10 years, while the declaration of 
                                                          
2 During the 1989 round table negotiations between the communist authorities and Solidarity leaders both sides 
reached an agreement, often referred to as ‘Solidarity consensus’ that paved the way for liberation and 
democratization in Poland.  
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Polish ancestry as the second response increased by over 37% – a typical process of 
‘ancestral dilution’. As one could expect, a majority of those who declared Polish ancestry as 
the second response are young people (new generation of Polish immigrants) – 73% of those 
are under 50 years old (see Table 1).   
Table 1. Australian residents of Polish ancestry: census of population data 
 Number of 
people born in 
Poland 
Number of people 
who speak Polish 
at home 
Number of people 
with Polish ancestry 
1st response 
Number of people 
with Polish ancestry 
2nd response 
2006    52,254    53,391    103,484    60,318 
2011    48,677    50,695    103,501    66,853 
2016    45,370    48,080    100,818    83,153 
  Data Source: www.abs.gov.au 
The Polish diaspora remains very religious but it is also secularizing fast. About 70% of 
Polish-born Australians declared their religious affiliation with Western Catholicism in 2016, 
which was a high percentage. But it is also 16% less than 10 years ago. Moreover, the 
proportion of non-religious people has doubled, in line with other ethnic communities, and 
similar to the general population in Australia, as well as general population of Poland. As 
expected, the number and proportion of Jewish Poles have declined as a result of ageing, 
declining migration from Poland, and the increasing migration of Polish Jews to Israel (see 
Table 2).  
Table 2. Major religious affiliations amongst Poland-born Australians 
 Catholic Jewish Secular Beliefs and No 
Religious Affiliation 
Number of 
people born 
in Poland 
2006 43,082 (86.7%) 2,872 (5.7%) 3,690 (7.4%) 49,644 
2016 31,979 (70.4 %) 1,623 (3.5 %) 6,512 (14.3 %) 45,370 
  Data Source: www.abs.gov.au 
The high level of Australian citizenship (85%) testifies to a generally high level of 
national and civic integration of the Polish immigrants, though only less than 2/3 of Polish-
born Australians speak English well or very well. Their identity has also been changing 
rapidly. While the early immigrants often identified as ‘Poles’ (or ‘Polish exiles’) and 
harboured hopes of swift return to (liberated) Poland, the more recent immigrants adopt more 
readily a hyphenated identity (‘Polish-Australians’ or ‘Australian Poles’) and they see 
themselves as ‘Polish settlers’, who arrived with the intention of staying here for good. 
Polish-born Australians live most frequently in Victoria, New South Wales, Western 
Australia, and South Australia, with a small, rapidly ageing, but still very well organized 
Polonia in Tasmania. The organizational life of Polonia has been most advanced in 
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Melbourne and Sydney, where the vast majority of Polish-born persons and their descendants 
resided. 
The decreasing number of people born in Poland reflects not only the declining 
immigration from Poland but also the ageing of the Australian Polonia. With the EU 
accession (2004) and the Schengen Treaty (2007) the immigration from Poland to distant 
Australia was rapidly reduced, while migrations of Poles to Europe increased. During 2001-
16 Australia was accepting, on average, only about 300 Polish immigrants per year. The rapid 
ageing follows the demographic trend affecting all immigrants from the post-WWII waves. In 
2016 the average age of the Poland-born persons was 58 years, compared with 45 years for 
all overseas-born and 37 years for the total Australian population3. As expected, the most 
numerous cohorts are those over 55 years old (reflecting the arrival of the ‘Solidarity wave’), 
while the school-age cohorts of Polish-born are very small, and this means that Polish schools 
are attended by the Australian-born children of Polish immigrants.  
This demographic profile reflects low fertility in the Polish diaspora. A typical Polish-
born family in Australia has less than 1.5 children – which is less than the national average of 
1.8. This low fertility has many causes: the increasing prosperity, the unsettling and 
conception-delaying experience of migration, delayed marriages, and popularity of family 
planning.  
Because of rapid ageing, Polish immigrants have one of the most rapidly increasing 
proportion of retirees and pensioners, and – consequently – relatively low (and declining) 
incomes. Ageing also means – as we mention below – the proliferation of Senior Clubs and 
Welfare Committees among Polish organisations. But the high number of new retirees from 
the ‘Solidarity wave’ (as reflected by the numerous cohorts 55+) also means that the 
Australian Polonia is likely to experience in the next decade a temporary (decade-long) boost 
in organisational membership and activism. This changing sociodemographic profile, as 
mentioned earlier, is a product of a specific ‘wave-like’4 immigration pattern; and to this 
pattern we must turn now.  
The two waves 
There have been numerous historical and sociological studies of the origins and formation of 
the Australian Polonia. The conclusions of these studies can be summarized in a few points.  
The pre-WWII immigration from Poland was small and diverse, including mainly Polish 
Jews, Protestant Silesians, and largely Orthodox Ukrainians from the eastern provinces5. 
Until 1947 there was practically no Polish ethnic community in Australia, though some 
                                                          
3 The median age was over 59, with 14% of Polish-born persons over 75 years old, and 36% over 60. 
4 This wave-like migration, one must add, is typical of Polish migration in general. Like Ireland, Poland 
spawned waves of mostly political migrants-refugees during every major political (typically accompanied by 
economic) crisis and upheaval. This is why migrants are seen at home – and identify themselves – as refugees, 
even if immediate motives of migration are economic. This specific ‘politicized’ identification, though, is 
seldom transmitted to the second generation of Australian-born children.  
5 In 19th century there were a number of Polish travellers and explorers including the well-known Pawel 
Edmund Strzelecki (a surveyor) and only a small Polish settlement in Polish Hill River, which disappeared in 
1914. 
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ephemeral ‘Polish’ organisations and initiatives were noted by historians (e.g., Paszkowski 
1962)6. 
The post-WWII (1947-56) wave of Polish soldiers-refugees, Displaced Persons, family 
reunion immigrants and few escapees from communist Poland laid the foundation for a 
powerful and relatively ethnically (and religiously) homogeneous, strongly pro-independence 
and anti-communist Polish diaspora. At its peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s it 
numbered at about 65-80,000 organized in ubiquitous Polish Associations, Ex-Servicemen 
organisations (SPK and Women Auxiliaries), as well as the affiliated Polish schools, folk 
singing/dancing ensembles, religious/church organisations and dozens of other organisational 
entities, many still active today7. The main function of these organisations was ethno-political 
and ethno-cultural representation. The early Polish migrants formed effective ‘ethnic 
lobbies’, anti-communist political pressure groups and pro-welfare groups aiding social 
adaptation and cultural transmission (see e.g., Zubrzycki 1988, Pakulski 1988).  
Adaptation of the early Polish immigrants to the new life was difficult. They arrived 
well before multicultural policies changed Australian institutions and the attitudes of ‘old 
Australians’ towards non-British ‘new Australians’. Moreover, the post-WWII Polish 
immigrants had limited social and cultural capital. They had, on average, low education – or a 
type of education that had limited application (job relevance) in post-war Australia – and they 
seldom spoke good English. Even if they did have professional education, skills and 
experience, these were not recognized in Australia, thus forcing immigrants into frustrating 
occupational degradation and into low skill, mainly manual, jobs. Moreover, most of the 
early (1947-8) Polish immigrants were professional soldiers, or de facto professional soldiers 
who after nine years of war had minimal civilian skills. They also had minimal contacts 
outside their ethnic communities (except for military contacts through Ex-Servicemen 
Associations and ROTA). Finally, many were forced to sign 2-year contracts for manual 
labour as the condition of sponsored migration and had very restricted opportunities for 
upward occupational mobility.  
In spite of these challenges and difficulties, by the late 1950s the post-WWII Polish 
migrants settled down successfully. Soon they recognized their ‘refuge’ was not temporary, 
and that that they were to stay here for good. They started to create ethnic associations, clubs, 
schools, folk groups and churches, published Polish journals, and started to transform from a 
migrant category and into a coherent immigrant community, with a rich, complex and strong 
                                                          
6 As noted by Markowski and Kwapisz Williams (2013, p.18), ‘The census of 1921 provides the first official 
data concerning the number of people of Polish origin living in Australia. Out of recorded 1780 persons, more 
than half arrived before the establishment of the Common-wealth of Australia in 1901 (Harris, Smolicz 1984, 
p.48). It is estimated that over 80 per cent of those arriving from Poland in the 1920s were ethnically Jewish 
(Price 1964, p.361).’  
7 As noted by Markowski and Kwapisz Williams (2013, p.19), ‘The Federal Council of Polish Associations in 
Australia was established in 1950 and by 1991 it had 30 member organizations, grouping 200 smaller 
associations fulfilling numerous social, cultural and educational functions. Although it is estimated that no more 
than 5 to 10 per cent of Poles in Australia participated actively in Polish organizations (Lencznarowicz 1994, 
p.402), numerous associations, foundations and societies offered diverse forms of social and cultural 
engagement, organizing festivals of Polish culture, establishing theatres and cabarets, folk dance groups and 
sport clubs, and publishing a weekly Polish language.’  
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organisational structure (Sussex and Zubrzycki 1985; Lencznarowicz 1994; Markowski, 
Kwapisz Williams 2013; Włodarczak 2005).  
The Solidarity movement that started in Poland in 1980, triggered a deep crisis, and 
ultimately defeated the communist regime. It resulted in a mass out-migration of nearly one 
million Poles, about 20,000 of whom came to Australia. These new Polish immigrants 
differed considerably from their post-war predecessors. The ‘Solidarity wave’ consisted 
mainly of young, educated families. They were ambitious and career-oriented immigrants, 
and they pursued both skilled manual, as well as white collar and professional employment 
and careers. Above all, the ‘Solidarity wave’ immigrants sought freedom and prosperity, and 
they integrated fast. They also represented a much broader spectrum of orientations, beliefs 
and lifestyles than the older immigrants8. 
The new Polish immigrants experienced a sudden liberation and democratisation of 
their homeland. Poland unexpectedly re-gained both freedom and democracy in 1989. Soon, 
it became the champion in post-communist transformation, a NATO member and a part of 
the enlarged EU. Polish migrants turned rapidly from condemned-at-home refugees into a 
proud Polonia, whose members were admired abroad and recognized as an integral part of the 
Polish nation ‘at home’.  
With this strengthened connection came also political-ideological divisions, as well as a 
rapid enhancement of ‘political-ideological identity’. This identity embraced the notion of 
politically-motivated migration as an escape from the communist victimisation and 
persecution. The new Polish migrants harboured a sense of political mission: informing 
others about the communist oppression, even if this oppression has ceased. They also 
developed a sense of victimhood, a view of migration as a sacrifice, even when they 
succeeded in their new lives and careers. 
From adaptation to integration  
The first stage of immigration and settlement in new country is often described as adaptation, 
that is, the initial social adjustment to the new life in the new environment. The early Polish 
immigrants experienced an unsettling and often traumatic social adaptation via the 
resettling/refugee camps, the famous ‘silver cities’. But they longed for normal life, for 
regular jobs, families, own houses and settled communities. To fulfil these dreams, they had 
to create their own adaptive networks, hence the tendency to form self-supporting, often 
closed and exclusive, ethnic networks and communities. The internal bonds of ethnic 
solidarity grew strong, and with them developed a high degree of political consensus and 
ideological-cum-religious unity and cohesion. The typical organisational forms emerging in 
this stage were territorial Polish associations and clubs, often in close proximity to Polish 
churches9, the ubiquitous ex-servicemen associations (SPK and ROTA), Polish 
                                                          
8 The similar differentiation could also be found in the Solidarity movement. See also Jupp (1988), Sussex and 
Zubrzycki (1985), Pakulski and Markowski (2004). 
9 Since there were no ethnic parishes, most Poles congregated around the ‘share’ churches where Polish services 
were offered regularly by the well-entrenched Polish priests. Many of those priests played the key role in 
establishing Polish organizations and in sustaining strong ethno-religious bonds of solidarity.  
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Saturday/Sunday schools, and Polish folk groups, mainly music, dancing and singing 
ensembles. These organisations reflected not only the adaptive needs but also the strong 
patriotic, pro-independence ethos and identity. The early Polish immigrants treated migration 
as a refuge from communist-dominated Poland. Therefore, the aims of the early Polish 
organisations combined the adaptive concerns with a drive to sustain Polish cultural values, 
religion, language and national traditions – all of them seen as threatened at home. They 
regarded migrant communities as repositories of the Polish culture. They considered their war 
experiences as ‘witnessing’ of suffering and sacrifice of all Poles. They also publicized the 
injustice of the post-war ‘Yalta order’ that left Poland – a faithful and loyal ally of the 
Western powers – at the mercy of Stalin and his communist servants. Intense anti-
communism, patriotism and religiosity (which often identified closely Catholic faith with 
Polishness) constituted the unifying ideological basis of the emerging Polish organisations 
and communities (Zubrzycki 1988).  
The later Polish immigrants (1980+) did not experience adaptive problems of such 
magnitude – and never achieved such a high level of unity. They did compete for scarce jobs 
in Australia in the early 1980s (following the 1982 recession), but they had an advantage of 
coming to the already multicultural, migrant-friendly Australia. Most of the new arrivals 
enjoyed numerous government-provided adaptive and integrative facilitations (language 
tutoring, skill upgrading, etc.), used assistance of multicultural NGOs, and benefited from 
wide assistance by their co-nationals organized in dozens of well-functioning Polish 
organisations. Their children could attend the already established Polish schools and cultural 
organisations. 
This better start enjoyed by the ‘Solidarity immigrants’ sometimes caused some social 
friction, a sense of envy-cum-resentment on the part of the ‘early immigrants’ who 
considered the more recent Polish immigrants as privileged10. The new arrivals were 
privileged by circumstances – and they were typically more successful than their 
predecessors in adapting to the new environment and integrating with the Australian society. 
Moreover, they also had an escape route – if they failed in adaptation and integration, they 
could always return to Poland, where living conditions started to improve very rapidly 
following the reforms introduced by the Solidarity governments in the 1990s. Therefore, their 
integration was faster and more comprehensive: they were getting career jobs, joined political 
organisations and participated in the Anglo-Australian cultural activities.  
Many promptly naturalized, embraced an Australian (often hyphenated) identity, 
usually supplemented by the proudly declared ‘Polish ancestry’ – the ancestry associated with 
widely admired Solidarity movement and its Nobel Prize winning leader, Lech Wałesa. Such 
a swift and successful integration was also found among some early Polish immigrants, but it 
was more typical of their children and grandchildren, as well as the Solidarity wave arrivals.  
                                                          
10 One must stress that not all Polish organizations welcomed the ‘Solidarity Poles’. Some conservative leaders 
of Polish organizations were deeply suspicious of new immigrants and treated them as ‘tainted’ by their 
allegedly ‘communist upbringings’ and (liberal-democratic) ideological preferences. 
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The changing Polonia and its organizational landscape 
The organizational landscape of the Australian Polonia reflects these trends and regularities. 
The number of Polish ethnic organizations – that grew rapidly in the post-war decades – 
started to decrease in the late 1980s. Between 1986 and 2012 alone, the number of active 
organizations in the Polish community dropped by about 50-70%11 . 
The ‘Solidarity wave’ Polish immigrants were ‘joiners’, rather than ‘organizers’. They 
were more interested in swift economic adaptation and social integration than in creating new 
ethnic organizations. Only when their children started to grow and reach the schooling age, 
they joined the older generation in organizing Polish schools and some culture-preservation-
cum-transmission groups. According to estimates, only some 0.5% of all Polish immigrants 
of the 1980s engaged in public activity in Australia (Pleskot 2014, p. 87).  
This downward trend seems to have slowed over the last 5 years, possibly due to the 
inflow of Polish retirees into the ranks of Polish organizations. The most affected by this 
organizational depletion are ex-servicemen associations, regional Polish associations and 
formerly ubiquitous Polish clubs. Interestingly, there are also newly formed groups and 
initiatives, such as proliferating Senior Clubs and welfare committees, as well as more openly 
political groups, some of which are visible mainly (if not exclusively) in/through the social 
media and the Internet.  
One must stress that some of the traditional ethnic-representative organizations, now 
run by the second generation and the retired immigrants, still persist and operate. There is a 
vibrant Federal Council (Rada Naczelna) of Australian Polonia12, as well as some state-based 
federations of Polish organizations. There are numerous local Polish Associations, as well as 
multiplying Polish Seniors’ Clubs and Welfare Committees. But, invariably, the ethnic-
representative organizations find it difficult to attract new members, especially from the new 
generation of children (and grandchildren) of Polish immigrants.  
The current (2017) organizational landscape of Australian Polonia reflects these socio-
demographic trends. Let us start by looking at the overall number of ‘Polish ethnic 
organizations’. The web lists between 100 (the National Council) and 200 (Consulate 
General) such organizations, ranging from the regional Polish Associations (25) and Polish 
Houses (16) to rapidly proliferating Polish Senior Clubs (40), as well as diverse cultural 
                                                          
11 A list prepared by Pakulski and Czernkowski during 1984-86 contained over 210 active Polish community 
organizations in Australia (Pakulski and Czernkowski 1986). But it was an incomplete list, restricted to 
mainstream ‘Polonia organizations’, that is, Polish Associations, clubs and their ‘organizational supplements’. 
The comparable more recent list (Directory of Polish Organizations 2012) available on the Internet shows only 
16 Polish community organizations, four newspapers and schools, eight folklore groups and two Scout 
organizations. This is also an incomplete list. The inventory published by the Federal Council mentions some 70 
active Polish community organizations, but it is also partly incomplete (the NSW organizations are largely 
missing, probably due to the absence of Federation website. The lists published by the Polish Consulate General 
in Sydney are more comprehensive, but they are seldom verified, and may contain many ‘dead souls’. A more 
detailed survey of Polish organizations in Tasmania conducted by Jan Pakulski shows a rapid decline from 
nearly 30 organizations (24 in Hobart) in the early 1980s to less than 10 in 2018. 
12 According to the calculations by the president of Federal Council currently it includes some 24-26 Polish 
organizations (some of them are federations) with some 5 thousand members. This represents approximately 8% 
of all Australians born in Poland (or Polish refugee families). 
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groups (26) and initiatives (8). The current President of the National Council of Polish 
Organizations in Australia estimates the number of active Polish organizations at 161. They 
include relatively new ‘bridging’ organizations/initiatives/groups promoting Polish-
Australian economic and cultural collaboration, whose number ranges from 6 to 12, 
depending on the classification criteria. They are not exclusively Polish in their membership 
and focus, so their number is difficult to establish, but almost all of them are very successful 
in their respective fields of activity. 
A good example of such a relatively new (though now defunct) integrative initiative-
cum-organization was Help Poland Live (HPL). It aimed at aiding Poles at home during the 
economically disastrous 1980s. HPL proved a great success in both mustering economic aid 
for impoverished Poland (estimated at about 3 million dollars), and in integrating Polish 
immigrants, as well as many Australian supporters. Another example of such ‘bridging’ 
(Polish-Australian) organizations is Polcul Foundation, currently renamed Jerzy Boniecki 
Polcul Foundation. It collected multi-million dollar funds in Australia and granted over 1600 
financial awards, initially (1980-89) to Polish pro-democratic dissidents and Solidarity 
activists, and then (1990+) to philanthropic activists in Poland. Australian ‘Polculs’ (known 
also as ‘kangaroos’), have been playing a very important role in pro-democratic 
transformations in Poland, as acknowledged by all free Polish governments. It still operates 
successfully and enjoys a patronage of the Australian government.  
One should also mention the Australian Institute of Polish Affairs, known as AIPA. The 
member-funded Institute, established in 1991 by the most prominent members of the ‘old’ 
(post-WWII) and ‘new’ Polish immigrants, is not only ‘bridging’ but also ‘trans-ethnic’. It 
accepts non-Polish members and conducts its affairs in English. Its aims include 
strengthening the relations between the two nations (Poland and Australia), publicizing the 
achievements of the Polish post-communist transformation, and conducting Polish-Jewish 
dialogue13. AIPA’s activities – in Australia and Poland – represent a specific form of public 
diplomacy in the ‘transnational public domain’. Over two dozen distinguished Polish guests 
were invited by AIPA to Australia and ‘networked’ with the members of Australian political, 
cultural and economic elites. At the same time, the Institute organizes public lectures, 
academic symposia involving prominent Australians, and book launches in Poland.  
Conclusions 
The Australian Polonia is ageing, shrinking in size and rapidly differentiating – some would 
say ‘normalizing’. The organizational ‘core’ of the Australian Polonia, increasingly managed 
by children of Polish immigrants, still presents a united front in cultural and social debates by 
avoiding conflicts and carefully bracketing political and generational differences. But more 
recently Polonia started to show signs of growing division that mirror the divisions in Polish 
society. The new sources of this division are located ‘at home’, in Poland, where the new 
                                                          
13 AIPA is too universalistic to be called an ‘ethnic organization’. Yet it attracts people who are interested in 
Poland and Polish-Australian relations, maintains very good contacts with the Australian and Polish cultural, 
media, economic and political elites, and, above all, is very active organizing regular promotion events both in 
Australia and in Poland. 
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right-nationalist government is taking an ‘illiberal turn’. The public and social media – 
increasingly global and accessible – disseminate the division worldwide. 
The traditional ethnic organizations formed by the post-WWII immigrants – Polish 
Associations, Ex-Servicemen organizations, Polish Saturday Schools, and Church groups – 
are either withering away or changing their functions. They are turning gradually into senior 
clubs and de facto ethnic ‘welfare committees’ that direct voluntary help and state-sponsored 
assistance to ageing Polish immigrants. There are also well-functioning Polish Associations, 
as well as Polish schools and some cultural groups (typically folk dancing groups), but their 
number and membership are dwindling. The ‘Solidarity wave’ has stimulated these ethno-
representative and culture-sustaining organizations, but the impetus seems to be reaching its 
end.  
The Australian Polonia changes gradually from immigrant community into ‘people of 
Polish ancestry’ and this trend is likely to continue in the absence of renewed mass migration 
from Poland. People of Polish ancestry develop hyphenated identities (‘Polish-Australian’) 
that tend to grow stronger when Poland enjoys a good reputation, and that dwindle when 
Poland’s the international reputation suffers setbacks. Polish organizations are likely to 
continue their transformation from ethno-specific (particularistic) towards more 
universalistic, ‘transcultural’ or ‘bridging’.  
The traditional ‘ethno-representative’ organizations, such as regional Polish Associations, as 
well as the ethno-religious organizations (Church Committees, Rosary Circles, etc.) are likely 
to gradually wither away, due to a rapid secularization and differentiation of Polonia. Equally 
uncertain is the future of Polish schools and folk groups. All ethnic schools, for example, face 
not only escalating costs and shrinking subsidies, but also a growing competition from web-
based courses that are cheap and accessible. One may also mention a growing impact of 
proliferating and widely accessible in-country courses in Poland. Such courses prove very 
attractive to young Australians with Polish ancestry, and they become more accessible due to 
grants and declining cost of long-distance travel. 
The most rapidly growing Polish ethnic organizations in Australia in the first decade of the 
21st century are various senior clubs and welfare committees catering for ageing and ailing 
Polish immigrants. This high demand for ethnically-specific old-age services, however, is 
likely to decline due to the demographic trends. By contrast, the general ‘bridging’ 
organizations prosper, and look robust. Obviously, their future success is conditional on the 
ability of their leaders to negotiate a shift from hierarchical ‘ethno-representative’ bodies to 
more horizontal ‘partnership-collaborative’, ‘bridging’ and ethnically plural bodies.  
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